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instant case involved a remedial trust. Thus, the Court has Shown
its reluctance to expand the, term fiduciary to the constructive
or remedial fiduciary situation. In addition, the Court has not
found a situation such as the present one to be sufficiently reprehensible to warrant characterizing it as "willful default or dereliction"
of duty. This being so, enforcement of the judgment in such a
case can be brought by execution only.
ARTICLE

52-

ENFORicEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5221(a): County in which money judgments are to be
enforced; defect in venue is waivable.
In Silbert v. Silbert 22 2 the corporate garnishee had been
served with a restraining order issued by the Supreme Court, of
Westchester County, in a separation action instituted by a wife
against her spouse, an employee of the garnishee. The corporate
garnishee, however, despite the restraining order, paid the husband
over $30,000 of which $6,000 was in dividends. Upon the wife's
motion, the court held the garnishee, whose only place of business
was in New York County, guilty of contempt for, its violation
of the restraining order. The appellate division, second department,
affirmed the lower court on this issue stating that although CPLR
5221 (a) requires that such a proceeding be brought in the county
in which the garnishee resides, which in this instance was New
York County and not Westchester County, such defect in venue
was waived by the garnishee's failure to take timely exception
thereto. It reversed in part, however, holding that the restraining
order did not reach wages and certain of the dividends which had
been assigned to other judgment creditors.
CPLR 5221 (a) specifically requires that a proceeding under
Article 52 must be commenced in "a county in which the respondent
resides or is regularly employed or has a place for the regular
transaction of business." 223 "Unless it meets the test of subdivision (a), the county in which the judgment was rendered is not
a proper place for an Article 52 special proceeding." 224 Generally
this rule takes into account the convenience of the respondent (the
apt to
garnishee here) and the probability that he will be more
2 25
be present in the county where he conducts his business
222 25
223

App. Div. 2d 570, 267 N.Y.S.2d 744 (2d Dep't 1966).
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224 Ibid. See Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Valenti, 17 Misc. 2d 386, 186
N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959).
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Where the special proceeding is instituted in the wrong county,
authorities have considered the error to be either a jurisdictional
defect or a defect in venue. Thus, in adopting the former position,
the City Court of New York has held a contempt order not enforceable against a judgment debtor who was outside that court's
jurisdiction.22 Similarly, a contempt order issued by the Supreme
Court, New York County,2 27 was held to be invalid since proper
venue would have been in Kings County. The order was considered void because it was entered without jurisdiction. This
view was also adhered to in a case holding that an order issuing
from a county where the debtor had neither residence nor place
defendant could not be punished for
of business was void and
2
contempt of that order. 28
In contradistinction to the jurisdictional defect argument, it has
been contended that such an error is a mere defect in venue.
The basic New York approach to venue is that it relates merely
to the place of trial and not jurisdiction, and that improper venue
229
may be waived unless objection is properly and timely made.
The validity of such a resulting judgment will in no way be impaired
by improper venue. CPLR 2001 lends support to this argument
by stating that if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced,
23 0
the defect or irregularity shall be disregarded by the court.
In stating that the defect in venue was waived by the garnishee's
failure to take timely exception, the court in the instant case held
that it was not a jurisdictional defect causing invalidity. If the
respondent in a special proceeding considers the county to be
inappropriate, inconvenient, or otherwise undesirable, he should
challenge it at its commencement. Failure to do so will be deemed
a waiver of any right to object to the county where the proceeding
is being heard, and the subsequent order will be jurisdictionally
valid.23'

226 Matter of Cedar Management Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 609, 212 N.Y.S2d
437 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961).
227 Aluminum Fabricators Inc. v. Apex Window Co., 4 App. Div. 2d
939, 167 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1st Dep't 1957). See Northville Dock Corp. v.

Aller Oil Co., 19 Misc. 2d 558 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959).
228

Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Valenti, supra note 224.
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239 Thus "slight mistakes or irregularities not affecting the merits or the
substantial right of a party shall not become fatal in their consequences."
7B McKINNrEY's CPLR 2001, commentary 558 (1965); Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Colegrove, 37 Misc. 2d 781, 219 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. Oneida
County 1961).
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